Age differences in social-cognitive functioning were assessed by examining sensitivity to the trait implications of behavioral cues when making social inferences. Adults (age range ϭ 23-86 years) read target descriptions containing positive and negative behaviors relating to either morality or competence. Consistent with past research, middle-aged and older adults were more likely than younger adults to make inferences consistent with the trait-diagnostic implications of the behaviors. Age was also associated with increased sensitivity to additional cues that moderated the diagnostic value of behaviors based on simple descriptive content. The authors argue that these age differences reflect a type of expertise based in accumulated social experience, a conclusion bolstered by an additional finding that social activity moderated age differences in social judgments.
Cognitive and intellectual functioning can be assessed in many different ways and in myriad contexts. Within the field of aging, a dominant trend has been to examine performance using tasks designed to tap into basic processes through simplification and minimization of extraneous influences (e.g., meaningfulness). Such studies have consistently demonstrated that cognitive performance is negatively affected by aging. In contrast to such research, however, there is also a body of literature that has shown that functioning within specific domains is often well preserved until late adulthood, and that increments in performance are often demonstrated through midlife into old age.
One such domain has to do with social-cognitive functioning (Hess & Blanchard-Fields, 1999; Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2000) . Skills within this domain reflect one's ability to process, represent, and use interpersonal information in a manner that facilitates effective functioning within the social domain. Research has consistently demonstrated advances in social-cognitive functioning through midlife, often continuing into later adulthood. For example, the ability to reason effectively about everyday problems within interpersonal contexts has been shown to be positively associated with age and uncorrelated with basic cognitive skills (e.g., Cornelius & Caspi, 1987) . Increasing age has also been shown to be associated with both the use of a greater variety of problem-solving strategies in such situations and greater sensitivity to the situation in selection of strategies (e.g., Blanchard-Fields, Jahnke, & Camp, 1995) . In addition, the strategies used by middleaged and older adults appear to reflect adaptive processes specific to their experience and life circumstances (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, & Norris, 1997) .
Other research examining social inferences presents a somewhat more complex picture. For example, research on theory of mind has shown inconsistent patterns of age differences in the ability to make appropriate inferences about the behavior of others based on complex levels of the actors' mental states (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998; Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) . A similar pattern of inconsistency has emerged in research on attribution (Blanchard-Fields, 1994; Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1994; Follett & Hess, 2002) , with older adults exhibiting both high levels of interactive attributions, reflective of complex reasoning, as well as relatively strong dispositional inferences, suggestive of the fundamental attribution error. Age differences in social inferences have been shown to be unrelated to basic cognitive skills (e.g., Maylor et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) , indicating that apparent declines may reflect other types of developmental processes. In support of this suggestion, there is some evidence that the tendency toward making the fundamental attribution error in later life may be based on older adults' adaptive use of idiosyncratic schematic structures associated with unique life experiences (e.g., Blanchard-Fields, Chen, Schocke, & Hertzog, 1998) rather than in declining ability.
Aging and Social Expertise
A final line of evidence that suggests increases in socialcognitive functioning with age comes from research by Hess and colleagues (Hess & Auman, 2001; Hess, Bolstad, Woodburn, & Auman, 1999; Hess & Pullen, 1994; Leclerc & Hess, 2004) , which forms the basis for the current project. These studies examined age differences in sensitivity to diagnostic behavioral cues in making social inferences; differential attention to positive and negative behavioral information across trait domains is used as a reflection of sensitivity (see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989) . Specifically, when viewing information pertaining to morality (e.g., honesty, helpfulness), individuals tend to focus on negative behavioral information as being more diagnostic than positive information in making inferences about where an actor falls on the relevant trait dimension. In contrast, positive information is given more weight when individuals are judging behaviors relating to competence (e.g., intelligence, athleticism). This asymmetry in the weighting of positive and negative information across trait domains appears to reflect culturally based belief systems regarding the bases for behavior. Sensitivity to this asymmetry in the diagnosticity of behavioral information increases with age (e.g., Hess & Auman, 2001; .
Hess and colleagues (Hess & Auman, 2001; Leclerc & Hess, 2004) have suggested that sensitivity to trait-diagnostic cues might reflect a type of expertise, with the obtained age effects reflecting increased accessibility and breadth of application of culturally shared social knowledge structures with development. Evidence in support of such a view is provided by the facts that (a) young adults possess basic declarative knowledge about trait-diagnostic behavioral information (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) but appear less likely than older adults to apply it in making judgments ; and (b) young adults are more likely to use traitdiagnostic information, and age differences in sensitivity to such information are reduced when its salience is increased (Betz, Gannon, & Skowronski, 1992; Leclerc & Hess, 2004; Skowronski & Carlston, 1992) . In addition, Leclerc and Hess (2004) found that observed age differences in sensitivity to trait-diagnostic cues are not based in alternative mechanisms relating to implicit theories regarding the malleability of personality traits.
The social expertise-based explanation for these findings is consistent with an adaptive view of adult development. This perspective, however, would be bolstered considerably by at least two types of additional evidence. First, expertise should be associated not only with the availability and accessibility of knowledge but also with sensitivity to cues associated with appropriate application. Thus, evidence of increased flexibility with age in the application of trait-diagnostic knowledge would strengthen the argument that social expertise increases through adulthood. Second, it is also important to demonstrate linkages between performance and factors hypothesized to underlie the development of expertise in adulthood. The current study was designed to provide data relevant to these two issues.
The Present Study

Context Sensitivity and Application of Social Knowledge
Our first goal was to determine whether the age-related increase in sensitivity to trait-diagnostic cues was associated with a concomitant increase in sensitivity to conditions under which knowledge relating to trait diagnosticity should be applied. To do this, we had different-aged adults read through a series of short characterizations of fictitious target persons, each of which contained both positive and negative behaviors relating to either honesty or intelligence. As noted before, when behaviors reflect traits associated with morality (e.g., honesty), people focus on negative information, whereas the opposite is true for competence-related traits (e.g., intelligence).
To test flexibility in application of knowledge relating to trait diagnosticity, we also manipulated whether the behaviors performed by the target had primary implications for self or for others. Wojciszke (1997) has found that when an individual's behaviors have their primary impact on others, observers tend to interpret these behaviors in terms of morality-based traits. In contrast, when behaviors have primary implications for self, observers tend to make competence-based trait inferences. Given the type of inferences (i.e., competence vs. morality) associated with behaviors focused on self versus others, there is a concomitant differential focus on positive behavioral information in the former case and negative information in the latter. The interesting point is that this focus occurs in spite of the descriptive content of the specific behavior. For example, at a descriptive level, lying is a behavior that reflects one's honesty and thus relates to morality. In the absence of other information, information that a person lies would have a greater impact on our evaluations of honesty than information that this person tells the truth. When additional contextualizing information relating to the focus of such behavior is provided, however, the emphasis on positive and negative information also shifts. For example, if one lies to another person to trick him or her, the descriptive nature of the behavior (i.e., lying) as well as the behavior focus (i.e., other) should lead to an observer making morality-based inferences that bias sensitivity toward negative information. In contrast, if the descriptively dishonest behavior is directed at oneself (e.g., lying about one's diet), the bias toward negative information in making trait inferences is decreased because of the increased probability that the observer is going to make competence-related trait inferences.
In this study, we were interested in whether there would be age differences in the extent to which context information based on behavior focus would affect trait inferences for behaviors descriptively tied to the morality or competence domains. Sensitivity to context would be exhibited in trait inferences that reflect both the descriptive content and focus of the behavioral information. Thus, for example, when descriptive content and focus bias different types of trait inferences (e.g., honesty descriptions with a selffocus), context sensitivity would be indicated by trait ratings reflecting appropriate trait-diagnostic information in both the morality and competence domains. That is, morality ratings should be negative and competence ratings should be positive. In contrast, when descriptive content and focus bias similar trait inferences, the influence of trait-diagnostic information should be observed primarily in that trait domain. Thus, for example, honesty descriptions with other focus should result in negative inferences about morality but have little influence on competence ratings. We argue that such context sensitivity reflects culturally based ideas about social behavior and thus is reflective of expertise. To the extent that aging is associated with an increase in expertise, it is predicted that context sensitivity will also increase with age. The ability on the part of middle-aged and older adults to modify inferences of behaviors based on context suggests that previously observed findings do not simply reflect rigid application of relevant traitdiagnostic knowledge structures based on the descriptive implications of behavioral information. Hess and Auman (2001) did examine trait inferences as a function of behavioral focus. However, they only examined the impact of focus on inferences in the trait domain relating to the descriptive content of the target's behaviors (e.g., trustworthiness ratings for honesty-related descriptions). As just noted, ratings in both the competence and morality domains would be necessary to obtain evidence for context sensitivity to both descriptive content and focus. The current study examined both.
Moderators of Social Inferences
Our second goal was to assess the extent to which sensitivity to trait-diagnostic behavioral cues in making social inferences was related to factors assumed to underlie social expertise. We hypothesized that expertise, as reflected in the use of trait-diagnostic information, would be associated with social experience, which permits both the acquisition of knowledge as well as practice in its application. To test this hypothesis, we collected information that directly assessed social experience, such as reported frequency of interaction and diversity of social network. We also assessed social experience in a more indirect fashion through personality characteristics, such as extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism, which have been shown to be associated with social involvement, size of social network, maintaining social relationships, and social activity (e.g., Asendorpf & Van Aken, 2003; Graziano & Tobin, 2002; de Man & Efraim, 2003; McCrae, 1996; Von Dras & Siegler, 1997) .
We predicted that higher levels of social experience would be associated with greater sensitivity to social cues in making trait inferences. We also hypothesized that this effect would be one of moderation rather than mediation. Specifically, whereas aging is associated with accumulation of social experience that is assumed to form the basis for the development of social expertise, it also seems reasonable to suggest that extensive experience earlier in adulthood might be sufficient for the development of expertise. This rationale is similar to that associated with the work of Staudinger, Smith, and Baltes (1992; Smith, Staudinger, & Baltes, 1994) on the development of wisdom. We anticipated that the effects of experience would be most evident in young adulthood, when comparatively high levels of social experience may compensate for the lack of cumulative experience over an extended period of time. With age, a lifetime of exposure to diverse social experiences may increase the probability of acquisition of culturally shared knowledge regarding the basis of social behavior and reduce the impact of individual differences in factors associated with social activity.
We also investigated the possibility that social expertise would be associated with complexity in social reasoning processes. We obtained measures assessing the extent to which individuals attend to cues in the social environment (e.g., self-monitoring, openness to experience), engage in complex versus simple thought (attributional complexity, need for structure), and enjoy engaging in cognitive activity (need for cognition). If social expertise, as reflected in sensitivity to trait diagnostic information, is based in reasoning processes, then more complex social reasoning should be associated with greater sensitivity to social cues.
Method
Participants
Adults (N ϭ 151) ranging in age from 23 to 86 years (M ϭ 54.44, SD ϭ 17.32) were recruited through newspaper advertisements and were paid $20 for their participation. Participants were spread relatively uniformly across six different age periods within this range: 25 (12 men, 13 women) aged 23-34 years; 27 (13 men, 14 women) aged 35-44; 23 (11 men, 12 women) aged 45-54; 23 (11 men, 12 women) aged 55-64; 28 (14 men, 14 women) aged 65-74; and 25 (14 men, 11 women) aged 75-85.
Materials
Eighty behaviors were created and compiled into 20 different target description sets, each of which contained two positive and two negative behaviors. The descriptions differed in terms of both the trait domain associated with specific behaviors (honesty vs. intelligence) and focus of the behaviors (self vs. other), resulting in four different types of descriptions: honesty-self-focus, intelligence-self-focus, honesty-other focus, and intelligence-other focus. Targets depicted in the behavioral descriptions were evenly divided by gender. The behaviors used in the descriptions were adapted from Hess and Auman (2001) and were moderate exemplars of their associated traits; the extremity of the trait and evaluative implications of the behaviors were similar across categories. For the behaviors used in the current study, mean evaluative extremity ratings for the four types of descriptions ranged from Ϫ.68 to Ϫ.87 for negative behaviors and .85 to .93 for positive behaviors, whereas mean trait representativeness ratings ranged from Ϫ.78 to Ϫ.89 for the negative and .79 to .90 for the positive behaviors. (The ratings represent standardized scores based on raw ratings from groups of young, middle-aged, and older adults. There were no age differences in ratings for the behaviors used in this study. See Hess & Auman, 2001 , for details.) For each target description, individual behaviors were ordered in a quasi-random fashion; the ordering of positive and negative behaviors was duplicated within individual descriptions across the four conditions.
Measures
Social activity. We adapted a version of Chapin's (1939) Social Participation Scale for the present study to assess the quantity and quality of social networks. Our intent was to obtain not a fine-grained analysis of social networks but rather some general indication of the extensiveness of social experiences. Participants provided current estimates for both the number of people with whom they had interactions on a weekly basis for six different groups of people (family members, spouse-significant other, close friends, acquaintances, colleagues-coworkers, and organizations, e.g., clubs, church) and the total amount of time (in hours) spent in these interactions. They also provided retrospective (i.e., 10 years ago) estimates for the same items to assess the degree of stability in social interactions.
As part of our standard background questionnaire, participants also completed four items adapted from the OARS Multidimensional Assessment Questionnaire (Duke University Center for the Study of Aging & Human Development, 1975 ) that were designed to assess social support. These items assessed the closeness of social relationships, degree of social contact, and participation in social activities, thus providing an additional index of social activity.
Personality. The NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992 ) was used to assess the personality traits of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.
Social reasoning. Four scales that have been shown to influence the nature of social inferences were used in the current study to assess complexity in social reasoning processes. The 28-item Attributional Complexity Scale (ACS; Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986 ) assessed self-reports of the extent to which individuals seek complex explanations for social behavior (current sample, Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .91). The 11-item Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) assessed the degree to which individuals exhibit preferences for simple means for organizing the world (current sample, ␣ ϭ .80). The 18-item short version of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) assessed the degree to which individuals enjoy engaging in complex cognitive activity (current sample, ␣ ϭ .89). Finally, the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, & 1986) assessed the degree to which individuals attend to cues in the social environment (current sample, ␣ ϭ .76).
Ability. Verbal ability was measured using the Vocabulary Test 2 from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976) . Processing speed was assessed using the letter and pattern comparison tasks (Salthouse & Coon, 1994) . Finally working memory functioning was examined using the Letter-Number Sequencing task from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) .
Procedure
Before arrival, participants were mailed a packet of information and were instructed to complete the enclosed test instruments and bring them to their appointment. This packet consisted of (a) a background questionnaire that included the social support questions, (b) the SF-36 Health Survey (Ware, 1993) , (c) the Attributional Complexity, PNS, Need for Cognition, and Self-Monitoring Scales, (d) Social Participation Scale, and (e) the NEO-FFI.
On arrival, participants were administered informed consent followed by the three ability tests. Once these measures were completed, participants were allowed a break and then were seated in front of a computer screen, where instructions for the primary task were orally read by the experimenter. Participants were told that we were interested in examining how people form impressions of others based on limited information. Participants read through each of the 20 target descriptions, one behavior at a time at their own pace, pressing a key on a response box to move to the next behavior. Once all four behaviors for a specific description were read, participants were prompted to orally provide a one-to three-word trait or characteristic that best described the target individual. Participants then made separate judgments about the target's trustworthiness and competence using 5-point Likert scales ranging from Ϫ2 (untrustworthy, incompetent) to ϩ 2 (trustworthy, competent) by pressing the appropriate button on the response box. The order of these scales was randomized throughout all of the 20 trials. After the presentation of these scales, participants rated how likable the target individual was using a Ϫ2 (unlikable) to ϩ 2 (likable) scale. Before viewing the 20 target descriptions, 2 sample descriptions were presented to familiarize participants with the procedure.
The presentation order of the 20 target descriptions was randomly determined across a series of five cycles. In each cycle, a description was randomly selected without replacement from one of the four possible Trait Domain ϫ Focus categories until all four categories had been sampled. Subsequent cycles followed the same random sampling technique until all 20 descriptions had been presented. Thus, one of each type of description was presented in each quintile of the test sequence. During the presentation of each target description, the computer captured study times for each behavior, the participant-generated descriptor, and ratings on each of the three scales. After completion of this task, participants were debriefed and compensated for their time, and any remaining questions were answered.
Results
Participant Characteristics
As can be seen in Table 1 , the relationships between age and both health and ability were similar to what would be expected based on the research literature. Specifically, vocabulary increased with age, as did mental health. In contrast, processing speed, letter-number sequencing performance, and physical health declined with age. Education was unrelated to age.
Primary Task Analysis
The primary dependent variables of interest were the trait and likeability ratings; study times for individual behaviors and participant-generated descriptors were of secondary interest. In all cases, general linear model-based analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were used to examine the effects of age, sex, trait domain (honesty vs. intelligence), and focus (self vs. other); the last two variables were within participants. In all analyses, age was treated as a continuous variable. In addition, given evidence in the literature that social-cognitive functioning may peak in midlife (e.g., Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1994; Follett & Hess, 2002; LabouvieVief, Chiodo, Goguen, Diehl, & Orwoll, 1995) , we also examined both linear and quadratic age effects. However, the latter remained in the analysis only if statistically significant effects emerged. When within-age tests were conducted to further examine significant (␣ ϭ .05) interactions, we followed recommendations by -ϩ84; 10: 11-66; 12, 13, 14, 15, & 16: 12-60; 17: 4 -24 . SF-36 ϭ SF-36 Health Survey. Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990) and performed such tests at representative points in the age distribution of 1 SD below the mean (age ϭ 37.1 year) for young adulthood, the mean (age ϭ 54.4) for middle adulthood, and 1 SD above the mean (age ϭ 71.8) for later adulthood. Effect sizes in the form of partial 2 are reported for significant statistical effects in the primary analyses, and only statistical effects relevant to our hypotheses are discussed.
Trait Ratings
We first examined participants' ratings of trustworthiness and competence. Of primary interest was the extent to which age moderated a bias either toward positive information when descriptions related to competence or contained behaviors with implications for self or toward negative information when the descriptions related to honesty or contained behaviors with implications for others. As in Hess and Auman (2001) , preliminary examination revealed that age was negatively correlated with overall mean rating (r ϭ Ϫ.29, p Ͻ .001) as a result of younger participants exhibiting a positive bias. For example, the average predicted raw rating at 25 years of age was 3.3 (of 5) compared with 3.0 at age 70. To control for individual differences in the use of the rating scale, all ratings were standardized within participants. Means calculated from these standardized scores were then subjected to analysis.
Analyses of participant assessments of trustworthiness revealed the presence of both aforementioned biases. Figure 1A) . Examination of predicted scores revealed that the effect of trait domain was significant ( ps Ͻ .001) at each of our representative age points. The significant curvilinear effect was due to ratings for honesty-related descriptions decreasing from young adulthood (-.48) to middle adulthood (-.58) and then increasing somewhat in later adulthood (-.54). Note also that the influence of age on trustworthiness ratings was located primarily in the honesty-related descriptions, in which morality inferences are most applicable. Ratings for intelligence-related descriptions were relatively low and stable across ages. A significant Age linear ϫ Focus interaction was also obtained, F(1, 145) ϭ 5.59, 2 ϭ .04, p ϭ .02, because of the difference in ratings for self-versus other-focused descriptions increasing in strength with age ( Figure  1B ). Specific contrasts revealed that the focus effect was not significant in young adulthood ( p ϭ .14) but was in midlife ( p ϭ .001) and later adulthood ( p Ͻ .001).
Analysis of competence ratings revealed similar aging-related patterns of sensitivity to trait-diagnostic cues. These ratings were significantly higher for intelligence-related than for honestyrelated descriptions (Ms ϭ .23 vs. Ϫ.03), F(1, 145) ϭ 32.81, 2 ϭ .19, p Ͻ .001, although the effect of focus was not significant ( p ϭ .13). Age did, however, moderate the effects of both domain and focus. A significant Age linear ϫ Domain interaction, F(1, 145) ϭ 7.61, 2 ϭ .05, p ϭ .007, reflected the fact that, although the domain effect was significant for all ages ( ps Ͻ .002), an agerelated increase in sensitivity to trait-diagnostic information was observed ( Figure 2A ). As with trustworthiness ratings, this effect was primarily grounded in those target descriptions (i.e., intelligence related) most relevant to inferences about competence. A significant Age linear ϫ Focus interaction was also obtained, F(1, 145) ϭ 10.26, 2 ϭ .07, p ϭ .002, as a result of age being positively associated with ratings for self-focus descriptions and negatively related with ratings for other-focus descriptions ( Figure  2A ). The focus effect was only significant in young adulthood ( p ϭ .003), but it was in the opposite direction to that predicted; ratings were more positive for other-focus than for self-focus descriptions. By late adulthood, ratings conformed more to that expected opposite pattern, suggesting that age was associated with increased sensitivity to the hypothesized trait implications associated with focus.
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The results are consistent with the hypothesis that increasing age is associated with greater sensitivity to trait-diagnostic behavioral cues associated with the descriptive content and focus of behavioral information when making social judgments. In one case, middle-aged adults were observed to exhibit the greatest attention to such cues, but for the most part the observed age trends were linear in nature. The effects associated with trait domain essentially replicate previous findings (e.g., . The effects associated with behavior focus, however, extend this prior work and suggest that the previously observed age effects generalize to other important dimensions associated with social inference.
Global Evaluations
Likeability. The final data obtained from this task-likeability ratings-were examined next. Although attributions of competence and trustworthiness might influence these judgments, these ratings were assumed to represent global evaluations of the targets that take into account a broader set of factors. This assumption was supported by the fact that the average correlations with likeability across the four Domain ϫ Focus conditions were .44 for trustworthiness and .23 for competence. Thus, whereas likeability ratings are reflective of participants' assessments of these specific traits, they also are not just representing the same constructs.
As with trait ratings, evaluative judgments were influenced by the trait diagnosticity of the behavioral information contained in the descriptions, as reflected in significant effects resulting from domain, F(1, 145) Figure 3) were similar in nature to those observed with trait ratings, with the impact of focus increasing in a linear fashion with age, whereas trait domain had the strongest impact in midlife. Analyses within trait domains indicated that the Age linear ϫ Focus interaction was significant for honesty-related descriptions ( p Ͻ .001) but not for competence-related descriptions ( p ϭ .30).
Prediction of evaluative judgments. Given the observed agerelated variation in sensitivity to trait-diagnostic behavioral information, we were interested in determining whether the age differences observed in evaluative responses might be accounted for by such differences. To do this, we performed a series of four stepwise regressions on the mean likeability ratings within each Domain ϫ Focus condition. In each analysis, we included the mean trustworthiness and competence ratings for target descriptions in that condition and interactions between each type of rating and the linear and quadratic components of age. Estimates of the strength of influence associated with trustworthiness versus competence ratings were obtained using predicted likeability scores based on the regression coefficients associated with the significant effects from each analysis. The difference in predicted scores based on trait ratings 1 SD above and below the mean for each rating scale was used as an estimate of the influence of perceptions of trustworthiness and competence on likeability.
From these effect estimates, three general results emerged. First, trustworthiness ratings (partial 2 ϭ .66 -.98) had a greater impact on likeability than did competence ratings (partial 2 ϭ .22-.49) regardless of description type. Given that trustworthiness has greater implications for social interactions than does competence, and that likeability is basically an interpersonal judgment, this asymmetry makes sense. Second, when the trait domain and focus of the target descriptions had similar trait implications, and thus resulted in a convergence on the same type of behavior as being diagnostic (e.g., positive behaviors in intelligence-self-focus descriptions or negative behaviors in honesty-other-focus descriptions), age did not moderate the impact of trustworthiness and competence ratings on likeability judgments. In both of these conditions, trustworthiness had a greater impact on likeability than did competence (intelligence-self partial 2 ϭ .91 vs. .22; honesty-other partial 2 ϭ .98 vs. .47). Third, when domain and focus led to opposite trait implications, in effect making both positive and negative behaviors diagnostic in the same descriptions, age was observed to significantly moderate the influence of trait ratings. For both honesty-self-focus and intelligence-other-focus descriptions, trustworthiness and competence ratings were significant predictors of evaluative responses ( ps Ͻ .05). In addition, age quad and age linear both moderated the impact of trustworthiness ratings in the former condition, whereas age linear moderated the influence of competence ratings on performance in the latter condition ( ps Ͻ .05). In both cases, these moderating effects were in the form of more equal weighting of competence and trustworthiness with increasing age, especially in later adulthood. Thus, for example, trustworthiness had a stronger effect on likeability in young adulthood than did competence for both honesty-self-focus (1.12 vs. .48) and intelligence-otherfocus (.66 vs. .08) descriptions. In contrast, in later adulthood, a more equitable weighting of trustworthiness and competence was observed (honesty-self-focus ϭ .34 vs. .48; intelligence-otherfocus ϭ .66 vs. .68).
These results indicate that there are systematic associations between trait inferences and evaluative judgments, and the factors that influence these judgments are similar across adulthood. There is also evidence, however, that increasing age is associated with greater complexity in these relationships, and that this complexity in part represents greater sensitivity to both the descriptive content and focus of behavioral cues.
Study Times
Per-word study times for the individual behaviors within descriptions were examined to determine whether participants differentially attended to positive versus negative information based on its diagnosticity. Times for the fourth behavior in each target description were twice as long on average as those in the other three positions, apparently resulting from participants preparing to generate a descriptor. Thus, these times plus those that were 3 SD above or below the mean for each participant (1.9% of the data) were eliminated from consideration. Means within each condition were then examined; behavior valence was included as an additional variable in the ANOVA. The only relevant effect that emerged was a significant interaction between domain and valence, F(1, 148) ϭ 28.78, 2 ϭ .16, p Ͻ .001, which reflected the differential diagnosticity of positive and negative information across domains. Specifically, positive behaviors were studied longer than negative behaviors (Ms ϭ 507 ms vs. 467 ms) for intelligence-related descriptions, whereas the opposite was true for honesty-related descriptions (Ms ϭ 482 ms vs. 506 ms). Focus of the behaviors did not reliably moderate attention to positive versus negative behaviors ( p ϭ .18). Age also did not moderate patterns of study times, suggesting that the previously described age effects in trait ratings were not based in variations in attention allocation.
Participant-Generated Descriptors
We next examined the characteristics of the descriptors produced by participants in response to each target description. Our interest here was the extent to which participants' interpretations were consistent with the trait implications associated with the behavioral information contained in these descriptions. To examine this, we first rated the degree to which each generated descriptor reflected competence and morality using Wojciszke's (1997) definitions. Specifically, morality-related traits "pertain to breaking or maintenance of moral rules and/or to doing good or bad things for another person" (p. 249), whereas competence-related traits "enable people efficiently to attain their goals or obstruct the goal attainment, whatever the goals may be" (p. 249). Each rating was made on a 3-point scale (1 ϭ minimally reflective, 3 ϭ clearly reflective of the respective trait domains). Agreement across raters was reasonably high for each scale (mean r ϭ .80).
Consistent with expectations, examination of morality ratings revealed descriptors to be more reflective of morality for honesty than for intelligence descriptions (Ms ϭ 2.1 vs. 1.4), F(1, 145) ϭ 211.08, 2 ϭ .59, p Ͻ .001, and for other-focus than for self-focus descriptions (Ms ϭ 2.0 vs. 1.5), F(1, 145) ϭ 120.36, 2 ϭ .45, p Ͻ .001. The only other effect approaching significance was an Age quad ϫ Sex ϫ Focus interaction, F(1, 145) ϭ 3.87, 2 ϭ .03, p ϭ .051. This was due to age moderating ratings in women only ( p ϭ .06); the focus effect (i.e., higher morality ratings for other- focus than for self-focus descriptions) was greatest in middle-aged women.
A complementary pattern of results was obtained when competence ratings were examined. As expected, descriptors were more reflective of competence for intelligence than for honesty descriptions (Ms ϭ 2.5 vs. 1.7) , F(1, 145) Focus, F(1, 145) ϭ 15.50, 2 ϭ .10, p Ͻ .001, interactions were also obtained. In contrast to the morality ratings, however, age moderated the impact of focus for both sexes ( ps Ͻ .02). For women, the focus effect (i.e., higher competence ratings for selffocus than other-focus descriptions) was once again greatest in midlife, whereas the focus effect was greatest in later life for men.
Not surprisingly, these results reveal that participants of all ages were sensitive to the descriptive content (i.e., trait domain) of the targets' behaviors; the nature of their descriptors was consistent with this content. Participants were also sensitive to the focus of the targets' behaviors, but these effects were somewhat weaker than those associated with trait domain and they were moderated by sex and age. Specifically, middle-aged women and older men appeared to be most sensitive to the trait-related cues contained in the targets' behaviors. Note that in spite of the observed interactions, however, the just-described focus effects were significant, Fs(1, 148) Ͼ 54, ps Ͻ .001, at all three representative points in the age distribution for both types of ratings. Thus, participants across the age span tested, interpreted the characteristics of the targets in a manner consistent with the predicted trait implications associated with the trait domain and focus of their behaviors. It is interesting that previously described age differences in trait and likeability ratings were observed in spite of this evidence that adults of all ages characterized the targets' behaviors in terms of similar trait domains. This suggests that the age-related variations in weighting given to positive versus negative information are based in differential sensitivity to the diagnostic value of the behavioral information rather than in differences in inferences about the actual trait domains reflected by the behaviors.
Moderators
In our final set of analyses, we investigated whether age differences in sensitivity to trait-diagnostic information were moderated by factors associated with social activity and social reasoning. A factor analysis using a maximum likelihood extraction method was used to obtain summary variables from our measured indexes of these constructs. These included the five personality factor scores obtained from the NEO-FFI, total scores on the Attributional Complexity, PNS, Need for Cognition, and Self-Monitoring Scales, and measures of social support and social participation. Social support was reflected in the mean responses to the four associated items on our background questionnaire (␣ ϭ .65). Six scores (current and past estimates of number of people interacted with, number of organizations belonged to, and number of hours in interaction) were derived from the social participation scale, and the mean of these scores was used as a measure of this construct (␣ ϭ .76). We performed log transformations on each score before calculating means because of the skewed distributions associated with each measure. Thirteen participants were missing scores on one or more of these measures, and mean values were substituted for the missing data. Using an oblimin rotation and an eigenvalue of 1.0 for extraction, four factors were identified that accounted for 48.5% of the total variance (Table 2 ). The strong negative loading of PNS suggests that the first factor might best reflect tolerance for uncertainty. The second factor appears to reflect sociability, with positive loadings associated with extraversion and conscientiousness and a negative loading for neuroticism. High loadings on openness to experience, attributional complexity, need for cognition, and self-monitoring suggest that the third factor taps into the complexity of social reasoning processes, as reflected in the tendency to actively attend to and process multiple cues in one's social environment. Finally, the fourth factor broadly reflects social activity, as reflected by high loadings for social support, social participation, and extraversion and a minor loading on agreeableness.
Correlations involving factor scores (Table 2 ) revealed that age was not significantly correlated with any factor, whereas the cognitive ability measures and education were positively correlated with the social reasoning factor. Ability was also associated with tolerance for lack of structure, as was mental health, replicating previous findings (Hess, 2001 ). Finally, mental health was also positively associated with sociability and social activity.
To examine the moderating impact of the constructs reflected in these factors, we replicated the previous analyses including factor scores as an additional between-participants variable, with separate analyses performed for each factor. Given the exploratory nature of these analyses, we decided to limit our examinations to our primary variable of interest: trait ratings.
Only two of the obtained factors influenced ratings. Social activity moderated both trustworthiness, Age quad ϫ Activity ϫ Domain ϫ Focus, F(1, 145) ϭ 8.97, 2 ϭ .06, p ϭ .003, and competence, Age linear ϫ Activity ϫ Domain ϫ Focus, F(1, 145) ϭ 4.58, 2 ϭ .03, p ϭ .04, ratings. These interactions were teased apart by comparing analyses involving participants who were high on the social activity factor with those who were low, using a factor score of 0 as the dividing point. For trustworthiness ratings, age was not found to influence performance for those high in social activity. In contrast, age moderated the effects of focus, trait domain, and their interaction for those low in social activity ( ps Ͻ .02). The nature of these effects can be seen when predicted scores are examined for the previously identified representative points on the sample age distribution (see Table 3 ). For the high-activity group, the pattern of predicted scores represents a relatively systematic influence of domain and focus regardless of age. In contrast, whereas older adults in the low-activity group exhibited performance comparable to those in the high-activity group, that of the younger and middle-aged adults in the low-activity group was not entirely consistent with expectations. For example, the shift in focus from self to other resulted in the expected shift to more negative trustworthiness ratings in older adults but not in the other two groups. Instead, the trait diagnosticity effect observed in the self-focus condition became exaggerated in the other-focus condition for the young and middle-aged participants.
When competence ratings were examined, a related but somewhat different pattern of effects was observed. Age interacted with both focus and trait domain in the high-activity group ( ps Ͻ .05); older adults exhibited larger effects relating to both variables than did younger and middle-aged adults. In particular, the older adults were more sensitive to focus than were the other two age groups. In the low-activity group, the only significant effects were due to trait domain and its interaction with age ( ps Ͻ .05); middle-aged and older adults exhibited significantly stronger domain effects than younger adults (see Table 4 ).
The only other factor to affect ratings was the sociability factor, in which a significant Sociability ϫ Focus interaction was obtained for trustworthiness ratings, F(1, 145) ϭ 4.32, 2 ϭ .03, p ϭ .04. Analyses within levels of this factor revealed that behavioral focus had a significant influence on the ratings only for those high on this factor ( p Ͻ .001).
In sum, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that social experience would moderate age differences in the construction of social inferences. Although the form of the effect varied somewhat with type of rating, the general pattern is consistent with expectations in that sensitivity to trait-diagnostic cues was associated with social experience either directly (e.g., young adults for trustworthiness ratings, older adults for competence ratings) or indirectly through age (e.g., older adults for trustworthiness ratings). In this latter case, the accumulation of experience over an extended period of time may have negated the effects of high levels of temporally constrained social activity.
Discussion
The current study provides evidence that is consistent with the general hypothesis that adult development is associated with increasing sophistication in social-cognitive functioning. Specifically, in support of an expertise-related explanation for previously obtained aging effects in social judgments (e.g., Hess & Auman, 2001) , we found (a) that middle-aged and older adults were more sensitive than younger adults to the multiple trait-diagnostic im- plications of behavioral information; and (b) that this sensitivity was associated with experience in the social world, which is thought to undergird the development of social expertise.
Context Specificity of Trait Inferences
Our main focus was on examining how the trait domain and focus of a target's behavior affected participants' inferences about that target. In general, increasing age was associated with greater sensitivity to both types of behavioral cues, a result consistent with expectations regarding aging and social expertise. Examination of the impact of the descriptive content (i.e., trait domain) of the behaviors revealed findings consistent with those of previous studies (e.g., Hess & Auman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987) . Specifically, middle-aged and older adults were more likely than younger adults to differentially weight positive and negative information across trait domains in accordance with the trait diagnosticity of the associated behavioral cues. Extending this previous work, we also found that these effects to be strongest for the relevant trait domain (e.g., trustworthiness inferences in the morality domain).
Of special interest in the current study was whether the focus of the behaviors performed by the targets moderated inferences based on the implications of their descriptive content. Consistent with previous work by Wojciszke (1997) , we found that when behaviors had primary implications for self, participants tended to interpret them as reflecting competence, resulting in a positivity bias in trait inferences. In contrast, behaviors having primary implications for others were interpreted more in terms of morality-related traits, leading to a negativity bias in judgments. Of importance to an aging-related social expertise viewpoint, the impact of focus, as reflected in the associated positivity and negativity biases, was observed to increase with age. This once more suggests that aging is associated with increased sensitivity to important information in the behavior of others. This, plus the fact that this focus information affected interpretations of behaviors that were descriptively consistent with specific traits, also suggests that previously observed findings regarding age differences in trait-diagnostic inferences (e.g., Hess & Auman, 2001 ) did not simply reflect older adults' rigid application of domain-specific trait-diagnostic knowledge in response to the descriptive content of behaviors. If true, inferences within trait domains would not be expected to be influenced by behavioral focus. Instead, the results suggest that increasing age is associated with increased sensitivity to the multiple implications of behavioral cues, and that older adults are indeed sensitive to the context in which a behavior occurs when making trait inferences.
It is interesting to note that the age differences in weighting of trait-diagnostic information occurred in spite of the relative age constancy in spontaneous inferences. That is, participants' selfgenerated descriptors of the targets reflected traits consistent with the descriptive content and behavioral focus of the behaviors. This suggests that the observed age effects in trait inferences were not based on differences in perceptions of the trait domains reflected by the targets' behaviors but rather on variations in the perceived information value of positive and negative behaviors within these domains.
In addition, age differences in trait ratings were observed even though age effects in the allocation of attention at study were minimal, replicating previous findings (Hess & Auman, 2001; Leclerc & Hess, 2004) . A reasonable interpretation of this finding is consistent with a developmental perspective on expert social knowledge. Specifically, previous research has shown that different-aged adults are similar in their judgments regarding the diagnostic value of individual behaviors. This suggests that the availability of declarative knowledge relative to trait diagnosticity is relatively stable across adulthood, which, when activated, may also influence attention to individual behaviors. The fact that age differences emerge in later judgments suggests that different-aged adults vary in how they ultimately use this knowledge in constructing social inferences.
The examination of likeability responses was also instructive. Specifically, age differences in overall evaluations of targets appeared to reflect the age-related sensitivity to different types of social cues. This sensitivity was apparent not only in the patterns of ratings when examined as a function of age, trait domain, and behavioral focus but also when the predictors of evaluative responses were examined. When the implications of trait domain and behavioral focus were at odds with each other, older adults were more likely than younger adults to incorporate information relating to both competence and morality inferences in their judgments. In contrast, younger adults tended to base their evaluations on the same information regardless of the nature of the behavioral information. This suggests once more that older adults' judgments about others are more sensitive to contextual information concerning the behaviors. The age effects observed for social inferences are consistent with a growing body of literature indicating that aspects of socialcognitive functioning continue to develop across the adult life span in healthy individuals. There was some evidence here and in previous work (e.g., Leclerc & Hess, 2004 ) that sensitivity to trait-diagnostic cues may be greatest in middle-aged individuals. This result is consistent with other research suggesting that social reasoning ability exhibits a high level of complexity in midlife (e.g., Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1994; Follett & Hess, 2002; Labouvie-Vief et al., 1995) , perhaps reflecting peak functioning during this stage of life. It should also be noted, however, that, whereas some curvilinear age effects were observed in our study, the dominant effects were linear in nature. It seems likely that the discrepancies across studies may in part relate to the assessment procedures used. Although the stimuli in our study tapped into social and everyday content, the actual target descriptions were less coherent than the stimuli used, for example, by Blanchard-Fields and Norris to assess attributional processes. These latter types of materials may have been more likely to activate additional types of social knowledge (e.g., schemas associated with specific types of situations) that subsequently influenced judgments. This appears evident in findings that older adults not only show higher levels of interactive attributions, which are representative of more complex thought, compared with younger adults but also more dispositional attributions, which are associated with biased thought. In the current context, the lack of coherence in target descriptions may have decreased reliance on idiosyncratic schemas, which, in turn, resulted in participants focusing on more basic-level information in making social inferences.
Moderators of Age Effects
The second goal of the current research was to identify factors associated with the hypothesized development of social expertise. Consistent with expectations, we found that social activity, as reflected in the size of one's social network, degree of participation, and personality factors associated with sociability, moderated the relationship of age to the complexity of social judgments. The nature of the social activity influence varied depending on the type of trait inferences being made. When making morality inferences, the influence of activity was greatest in young adulthood and dissipated over the remainder of the age span, whereas its influence was greatest in later adulthood when making competence judgments.
Obviously, the cross-sectional nature of our data limits any causal explanations that can be provided for these effects, but a reasonable interpretation for the obtained effects is possible if we assume that interindividual variability in social activity is relatively stable over time. In all cases, high levels of social activity appear to be associated with greater sensitivity to the trait implications of behavioral cues. It is the timing of these effects that appears to vary. In some cases, it appears that extended experience may be sufficient for the acquisition of expert knowledge underlying complex social judgments, with individual differences in level of activity becoming less important over time. In other cases, high levels of social activity across an extended period of time promote the acquisition of social knowledge. It also appears that high levels of social activity early in life may promote the acquisition of expert social knowledge in certain situations. Note that all of these patterns are consistent with a social expertise explanation for the obtained results in that social experience appears to form a basis for complex social inferences. The somewhat variable pattern of results across trustworthiness and competence ratings may reflect the higher level of salience associated with the inherent interpersonal nature of the former type of judgment. The general pattern of results is also consistent with other expertise-based accounts of social reasoning, such as that associated with wisdom, in demonstrating that age is correlated with the development of expertise and that specific types of experience can promote its development earlier in adulthood (e.g., Staudinger, Maciel, Smith, & Baltes, 1998) .
Somewhat surprisingly, there was little evidence that complexity of social reasoning was associated with performance. This finding is notable in two ways. First, it suggests that it is not one's tendency to think complexly that is associated with attention to social cues but rather one's accumulated knowledge regarding the value of specific cues. Second, the fact that the social reasoning factor was associated with ability also suggests that the observed age effects are independent of normative aging effects on basic cognitive skills. This pattern of results is consistent with other research demonstrating that aging-related variations in everyday social-cognitive functioning may be more tied to crystallized abilities rather than fluid skills (e.g., Cornelius & Caspi, 1987) . It also contributes to a body of research suggesting that age differences in adaptive modes of social-cognitive functioning in adulthood are not strongly mediated by basic cognitive ability (e.g., MacPherson, Phillips, & De Sala, 2002) . It is interesting to observe that this is also true for what appear to be aging-related biases in reasoning (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000) or declines in performance (e.g., Maylor et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) . For example, Klaczynski and Robinson (2000) found that middle-aged and older adults were more likely to use biased, heuristically based reasoning processes than were younger adults but that these age differences were based more in styles of processing rather than ability. Such findings underscore the importance of examining factors other than cognitive ability to understand functioning and performance in everyday contexts.
Several caveats regarding the social activity findings should be noted. First, the observed moderating effects of this putative expertise-related factor were not strong. This may reflect the actual nature of these effects. We argue, however, that these relatively modest effects may be more reflective of the measures used in the current study and our emerging understanding of the factors that underlie the development of social expertise. For example, our subjective estimates of social participation may underestimate older adults' social activity relative to that of younger adults given the documented declines in social networks and activity in later life (e.g., Lang & Carstensen, 1994) . The inclusion in our study of relatively stable personality traits associated with social activity may have compensated somewhat for the difficulty in obtaining accurate estimates of past experience. Nonetheless, concerns still remain. In addition, social activity is assumed to be a proxy for the more specific experiences that underlie development of the social expertise thought to be exemplified in the current study. It is best conceived of as a necessary, but not sufficient condition, with greater social activity increasing the probability that individuals will be exposed to conditions and experiences required for the development of expertise. These might include opportunities to (a) observe others, (b) be exposed to cultural views about behavior, and (c) form and test the validity of impressions about others. Thus, given the nature of the measures used in our study, the current results should be viewed as preliminary evidence regarding the role of social activity in the development of expertise. Future research would do well to increase the precision of both the causal relations inherent in this developmental trend as well as the measures used to assess expertise-related constructs.
